As has become par for the course of Hugh White’s books and essays, his most recent contribution, How to defend Australia (2019), stirred up a predictable level of controversy. The point that most intrigued me, though, was his discussion of the merits of a ‘focused force’ approach to structuring the ADF as opposed to the status quo ‘balanced force’ model.
This isn’t necessarily a new idea, but it was a useful reminder for me of a topic that has dropped off the radar a little. The default approach for most militaries across the world is to maintain a broadly balanced force. In broad terms: a force that is designed to be able to respond to a wide range of contingencies and conflicts. A focused force is one that is designed to respond to a much narrower conception of potential threat. Peter Layton sets out some of the options here.
I think the default to a balanced force approach is fairly easy to understand: the future is uncertain, and so it seems intuitively easier to hedge your bets, rather than risk being without a particular set of capabilities in the event that they are needed at short notice. There’s also the effect of self-interest, and each branch of the military wanting to secure its own slice of the funding pie. Furthermore, a balanced force can be argued to provide a base for expansion in times of war. That is, if you don’t maintain capability χ in peacetime (and the tactics, training, and procedures that go with it) then it’s nigh on impossible to introduce it into service with any level of effectiveness and coordination at short notice.
Of course, as Andrew Davies rightly point out, “there’s no law of nature that says a balanced force will better meet strategic challenges than one in which certain capabilities are emphasised. It makes far more sense to think hard about the capabilities that will best enable our forces to prosecute the most vital missions”. We can only spend each dollar once, so a force made up of lots of different capabilities, but one that lacks the numbers to provide the desired effect, is lazy thinking and a waste of resources: “balance is not an end in itself”.
The point of this exercise isn’t to make a case here for either approach; suffice it to say I find them both compelling in different ways. I’m sympathetic to the rationale, and I appreciate the logical structure of the argument. But ultimately, strategy is practical and political, not theoretical. I can’t help but think that there are enough states out there grappling with the same logic(s) of strategy and force structure but have ultimately fallen on the side of ‘balanced’ for one reason or another. Are we all missing something, or is the focused force just an intellectual pipe dream that fits the mould of what we should do in an ideal world? Therefore, my question is whether there are actually any real-world examples of an intentionally focused force that retains any credible strategic weight?
To take a nearby example, New Zealand might be considered a more focused force than Australia, particularly after the retrenchment of their combat air capability in 2001. That was deliberate, but they haven’t exactly gone ‘full focused’ either. Despite their very benign strategic circumstances, their army still possesses over 100 Light Armored Vehicles, scheduled to be upgraded or replaced by 2025/26. There is also the question of whether they will replace their two existing frigates when their service life expires, or whether they are better placed to invest in more Offshore Patrol Vessels. (There was a multi-part discussion on this topic over at Incline last year.)
Of course, New Zealand won the ‘peaceful geography’ lottery, so the potential for a particularly focused force dedicated to low-threat, permissive environments and tasks such as peacekeeping and maritime patrol is far greater. That is why I say a focused force that retains any credible strategic weight. Hugh White acknowledges this in HTDA, but it makes me think how applicable the concept is at its fullest logical extent for larger states, or those in more threatening environments.
In response to my initial tweet thread and call for exemplars, Sam Roggeveen suggested Sweden, Euan Graham offered up Israel and Singapore, and Craig Beutel argued for nuclear-armed states as the only ones able to possess a focused, credible force. Bryden Spurling also made the observation that in any case, given increasing unit costs, it’s growing increasingly hard for states to maintain credible balanced forces.
I admit my first impression is that those states have also maintained broadly balanced forces, but tailored to their own circumstances (for example, compared to Australia, the range requirements for platforms is clearly far smaller). Clearly though, I need to test my hypothesis that the balanced force approach is the default approach. To do so I will investigate the force structure and strategic outlooks for each of Sweden, Singapore, and Israel to compare them with the approach taken by Australia.
For now, my initial takeaway is that there’s space to be more focused when it comes to strategic and force structure decisions, but I remain a little unconvinced of the applicability of the model. That said, it’s another great example of what I think is Hugh White’s biggest strength: calm, logical, systematic arguments that make you think (and feel a little uncomfortable). Australia’s resident ‘strategist provocateur’. It’s a must-read for anyone interested in Australian defence policy and for anyone interested in the strategy-capability nexus. If you can’t get your hands on the book, Hugh also provides a great overview in two La Trobe Asia recordings: one of the Melbourne book launch, and the other in conversation with Matt Smith, the host of LTA’s regular podcast Asia Rising.
Until anon.
David M. Andrews 
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