Carney bells the cat?

On Tuesday at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney delivered what has been described by many prominent analysts and commentators as one of the most consequential geopolitical speeches in recent decades…but I confess that it left me feeling somewhat underwhelmed.

Carney’s speech – entitled Principled and pragmatic: Canada’s path – began with pouring a bucket of cold water over the concept of ‘rules-based international order’ which has been the bedrock of much of the Western geopolitical vision for the best part of 80 years. He likened it to “living within a lie”, borrowing an analogy from Václav Havel, where people (or here, states, companies, and other international bodies) hold fragile systems together by their participation in “rituals they privately know to be false.”

He called for “companies and countries to take their signs down” – to own up to the falsehoods of this long-championed rules-based international order amidst a dramatic “rupture” caused by the great powers “using economic integration as weapons. Tariffs as leverage. Financial infrastructure as coercion. Supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited.” In short, when “integration becomes the source of your subordination” something needs to change.

That’s quite a bracing statement from the leader of a G7 nation and founding NATO member, who also previously held the role of Governor of the Bank of England – all significant components of that selfsame international order. Further, he declared that period of history is over; that the bargain of accepting US hegemony for the benefits of economic integration and global public goods “no longer works.” To quote him at length:

For decades, countries like Canada prospered under what we called the rules-based international order. We joined its institutions, praised its principles, and benefited from its predictability. We could pursue values-based foreign policies under its protection. We knew the story of the international rules-based order was partially false. That the strongest would exempt themselves when convenient. That trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. And that international law applied with varying rigour depending on the identity of the accused or the victim. This fiction was useful, and American hegemony, in particular, helped provide public goods: open sea lanes, a stable financial system, collective security, and support for frameworks for resolving disputes. So, we placed the sign in the window. We participated in the rituals. And largely avoided calling out the gaps between rhetoric and reality. This bargain no longer works.

I can’t think of many scholars of international relations who would fundamentally disagree with that analysis. In the trade-off of power, values, and interests, the present international order is one predicated on US hegemony, albeit alongside other powerful states – the very fact that there are permanent veto holders on the UN Security Council clearly points to this – and that consequently the rule-setters have not always abided by the rules they hold over the heads of others.

Now it’s true that Western heads of government haven’t generally belled that cat and said out loud and in public what Carney has done here. This hypocrisy is well documented, but often deployed from those outside the key avenues of power rather than from within. Nonetheless, while far from perfect, the benefits of the Western liberal order are still real. Those same open sea lanes, global financial systems, peacekeeping frameworks, courts of arbitration and so on, have been sources of public good, despite their shortcomings.

My question then is, in taking our signs down, moving on from the liberal order, and trying to build new forms of international architecture, what would we be leaving on the table which could, or should, be salvaged? Let us not be too quick to celebrate the end of the status quo. As much as there is (and has been) a crucial role for middle powers in setting and shaping international order, there are some significant hurdles to overcome before any new vision might be in reach.

That said, if the intended purpose of the speech was principally to pull back the curtain, initiate a wider debate, and call for greater unity and cooperation between transatlantic powers without relying on the United States amidst Trump’s lustful designs on Greenland, I would be happily on board. However, the prescription offered in response to the diagnosed rupture rings hollow as diplomatically ‘more of the same’ for what is framed as a grand international vision.

Carney’s four objectives for middle powers are to name reality, act consistently, build what we claim to believe in, and reduce the leverage that enables coercion. To be clear, I’m not opposed to these objectives, but talk of “values-based realism”, a “principled and pragmatic” foreign policy, and “variable geometry” in partnerships is the kind of approach Western governments have advocated for years.

Speaking to the context I know best, Australia’s mantra of “cooperate where we can, disagree where we must, and engage in the national interest” doesn’t seem so far removed from these goals, nor does its rhetorical alignment with forms of progressive realism advocated by Carney’s Anglophone counterparts Sir Keir Starmer and Anthony Albanese in Britain and Australia.

The framing of the international environment as one defined by “great power competition” has also been commonplace across strategic planning documents in Europe, North America, and the Indo-Pacific for years now (though “great power predation” might be more apt, based on current events). Attempts to reduce coercive power through economic diversification and building up sovereign military capabilities have been supercharged over the past decade due to acts of Chinese and US economic coercion, alongside Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but with limited efficacy to date in most cases.

This piece has already gone on too long to dive into the following point in great detail, but a pertinent sidebar is the lingering challenge of addressing the near complete reliance of middle powers on the great powers in relation to defence equipment (whether US or Chinese) and intelligence networks, to pick out two important aspects of state power and influence. This isn’t a matter of throwing our hands up and saying it’s all too hard so we’ve got to stick with the status quo, but to further borrow from Aesop’s fable referenced in the title, meaningfully addressing the problem is much harder than identifying it!

I’m conscious that I seem to be very much in the minority here, so I can’t help but feel there must be something I’ve missed, yet I can’t get past the disconnect between the two halves of the speech. Radical problems would surely require radical solutions, but that’s not what was put forward. Carney noted in his final lines:

“The old order is not coming back. We should not mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy. But from the fracture, we can build something better, stronger, and more just.”

I share the ambitions of a better, stronger, and fairer world, and would love to see Canada, Australia, and many other middle powers playing a bigger role in making that happen, so hopefully this is the start of real substantive, coordinated action to bring that to life. Talk is cheap, and politics is hard, messy, and expensive. How deep are the pockets of middle powers, or rather, how deep will their electorates permit them to be?

We can look at the rules-based international order without rose coloured glasses and yet fear that we absolutely will mourn it in years to come if we don’t address this situation head-on.