My first academic book chapter was published a few weeks ago, part of the edited volume Strategy and Airpower in the East and South China Sea: China, the United States, and Great Power Rivalry, edited by Dag Henriksen, Nina M. Bjørge, and Mari G. Bårdsen of the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy.
I was commissioned to write about the Quad and its contribution to regional security in the Indo-Pacific, especially concerning US strategy vis-à-vis China. With the book being paywalled, I’ve reproduced the abstract below, but hope to repurpose the chapter into a freely accessible policy-focused piece in due course.
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The United States’ 2025 National Security Strategy and its companion 2026 National Defense Strategy together comprise the current declaratory policy which sets the shape of US Indo-Pacific strategy.
They outline an ambition to achieve deterrence by denial within the First Island Chain and have a clear emphasis on prioritising the missions and resources available to the US Government.
Acknowledging that they cannot do this alone, these strategies seek to repurpose and reenergise existing alliance and institutional frameworks in pursuit of deterrence. The Quad is one such institution in their sights.
As one of the oldest and most prominent minilateral institutions in the Indo-Pacific, the Quad has come to play an important role in regional public goods provision, technical standard-setting, maritime security, and disaster relief.
It continues to be a key mechanism through which its members pursue their strategic objectives, but it is increasingly clear that the Quad’s established roles and priorities do not align with the preferences of its most powerful member.
With even the United States’ most powerful alliance – the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – not safe from the White House’s ire, where then does this leave the Quad?
To answer that question, this chapter provides a structured examination of the Quad’s experience of evolution, stagnation, and collapse: from its earliest antecedents in disaster relief coordination, to its abortive initial attempts at formation, and through the current activities and evolutions of “Quad 2.0” to some possible emergent futures – including the risk of it disintegrating once again, despite shared threat perceptions.
The resulting picture should be an uncomfortable one for proponents of the Quad. Where it was once a first mover, it is being overtaken in some areas by smaller and more clearly defined strategic minilaterals. It has a good record of delivery, yet its historic emphasis on diplomatic initiatives and public goods provision has meant that its successes are of little interest to the current US Government.
The Quad certainly has the capacity to evolve further, but doing so will depend on its members coming to terms with some questions the institution has never truly answered.
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